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Back to the Congressional Drawing Board:
Inapplicability of the AUMF to Al-Shabaab
and Other New Faces of Terrorism
BY PIERCE RAND*
“Now, make no mistake, our nation is still threatened by terrorists. From Benghazi to
Boston, we have been tragically reminded of that truth. But we have to recognize that
the threat has shifted and evolved from the one that came to our shores on 9/11. With a
decade of experience now to draw from, this is the moment to ask ourselves hard ques1
tions—about the nature of today’s threats and how we should confront them.”
- President Barack Obama

INTRODUCTION
Following the 9/11 attacks, Congress enacted the Authorization for
the Use of Military Force (AUMF) in order to safeguard our nation
from future terrorist threats.2 The language of the AUMF denotes a narrow scope—sanctioning military action exclusively against Al-Qaeda
and other responsible entities. To best serve the needs of America’s
“War on Terror,” however, this narrow scope has now expanded to include alternative global Islamist terrorist organizations.3
Over the last twelve years, America’s efforts during this “War on
Terror” have achieved mixed results. Most authorities would agree that
the death of Osama Bin Laden, coupled with the frequent drone and
military strikes against prominent Al-Qaeda officials, have drastically

* J.D., Loyola Law School, Los Angeles. I would like to thank Professor David Glazier for all of
his help navigating the complexities of this topic. Additionally, I would like to thank the editors
and staff of the ILR for all of their hard work on this article.
1. Barack Obama, President of the United States, Remarks at the National Defense University
(May
23,
2013),
available
at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/2013/05/23/remarks-president-national-defense-university [hereinafter Obama’s Remarks].
2. Authorization for Use of Military Force, S.J. Res. 23, 107th Cong. (2001).
3. Jennifer Daskal & Stephen I. Vladeck, After the AUMF, LAWFARE, 5-6,
http://www.lawfareblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/After-the-AUMF-Final.pdf (last visited March 27, 2015); see also Philip H. Gordon, Can the War on Terror Be Won? How to Fight
the
Right
War,
FOREIGN
AFF.
(Nov.
6,
2007),
at
1-3,
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/63009/philip-h-gordon/can-the-war-on-terror-be-won.
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diminished Al-Qaeda’s prominence and operational capacity. 4 The
same, however, cannot be said of other more recently established Islamist terrorist organizations, which have not only persisted in the face of
American military might, but also stiffened their resolve and deepened
their militant roots.5 Al-Shabaab in Somalia represents a prime example
of this phenomenon; the increased American military attention has
failed to deter the organization’s continuous rise in prominence predicated on acts of violence and terror.6 This has allowed Al-Shabaab,
along with other organizations, to readily fill the vacancy left in the
wake of Al-Qaeda’s inescapable decline, and these emboldened Islamist
groups have developed into significant international terrorist threats.7 As
President Obama aptly put it, the landscape of international terrorism
has indeed “shifted and evolved.”8
Armed with over a decade of experience from combating amorphous terrorist cells and a rapidly growing fleet of technologically advanced drones capable of delivering lethal payloads to the far corners of
the globe, America is militarily and tactically prepared to combat these
evolving adversaries.9 Indeed, military action against many of these
groups have already begun, as evidenced by the drone and military
strikes launched against Al-Shabaab over the past several years.10 While
strategically effective, these strikes are not without controversy; in fact,
a growing question among the legal community espousing concern has
emerged: are these drone and military strikes legal?11
The following discussion will explore this question by applying

4. BUREAU OF COUNTERTERRORISM, U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS ON
TERRORISM
2011
5
(2012),
available
at
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/195768.pdf.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Obama’s Remarks, supra note 1.
9. Thomas Michael McDonnell, Sow What You Reap? Using Predator and Reaper Drones
to Carry Out Assassinations or Targeted Killings of Suspected Islamic Terrorists, 44 GEO.
WASH. INT’L L. REV. 243, 255 (2012), available at http://docs.law.gwu.edu/stdg/gwilr/PDFs/442/2-%20McDonnell.pdf.
10. Chris Woods, Militants and Civilians Killed in Multiple US Somalia Strikes, THE
BUREAU
OF
INVESTIGATIVE
JOURNALISM
(Feb.
22,
2012),
http://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/2012/02/22/militants-and-civilians-killed-in-up-to-20-ussomalia-strikes-new-study-shows/.
11. Robert Chesney, Back to Lethal Force in Somalia: What If Anything Does the Drone
Strike on Ibrahim Ali Signify?, LAWFARE (Oct. 31, 2013, 5:38 PM),
http://www.lawfareblog.com/2013/10/back-to-lethal-force-in-somalia-what-if-anything-does-thedrone-strike-on-ibrahim-ali-signify/.
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domestic legal authority—specifically the 2001 Authorization for Use
of Military force (AUMF) and its dubious “Associated Forces” expansion—to Al-Shabaab, a terrorist organization that has recently made
headlines with its violent attack on a Nairobi mall resulting in over sixty-seven deaths.12 It is true that one could potentially derive alternative
domestic authority from the Presidential powers enumerated in Article
II of the United States Constitution.13 However, the scope of these powers is particularly convoluted, and application of Article II would present complicated questions of Constitutional law that warrant independent consideration. Consequently, this discussion will presume that the
2001 AUMF operates as a congressional declaration of war and thus
provides the preeminent authority used to justify American use of force
against Al-Shabaab. As will be demonstrated in the subsequent analysis,
the AUMF is a relic from the previous decade applicable to an international armed conflict in its final stages. Such an aged authority not only
offers an attenuated legal basis for American military action against AlShabaab and other new faces of terrorism, but has also created the impression in the international community that our war on terror is boundless, extrajudicial, and impenetrably veiled in secrecy.
This discussion will be developed in the following format: Section
II will explore the history of Somali Islamism and the development of
Al-Shabaab. This historical perspective will provide context and establish the foundation for later legal analysis when searching for a substantive connection between Somali Islamist organizations and Al-Qaeda.
Section III will briefly discuss the recent acts of Al-Shabaab terrorism
and America’s military response to these acts. The purpose of this section is to unambiguously demonstrate Al-Shabaab’s prominence among
international terrorist organizations as well as delineate the scope of
American use of force against Al-Shabaab. Section IV will evaluate the
legality of America’s military strikes against Al-Shabaab by determining whether the terrorist organization falls within the parameters of the
2001 AUMF as outlined by Congress. In addition, this section will explore the development of the Associated Forces label and evaluate the
legal permissibility of this broad extension to AUMF authorization.
Section V will conclude that the AUMF’s limited scope cannot be construed to cover Al-Shabaab and other modern terrorist organizations and
12. Daniel Howden, Terror in Nairobi: the Full Story Behind al-Shabaab’s Mall Attack,
THE
GUARDIAN
(Oct.
4,
2013,
8:09
AM),
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/04/westgate-mall-attacks-kenya.
13. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1
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thus, further congressional action is required to ensure the legality of
military strikes against these new faces of terror
II. SOMALI ISLAMISM AND THE HISTORY OF AL-SHABAAB
Somalia is a small, impoverished, mostly ungoverned nation bordered by Ethiopia and Kenya in Southeastern Africa.14 Nearly all Somalis identify as Sufi Muslims.15 Sufism is a non-extremist branch of Islam
focused on prayer and worship, and is less concerned with adherence to
the Sharia.16 A comparatively small minority of Somalis, however, adhere to Salafism, an Islamist17 and militant branch of the Muslim faith
divergent from Sufism. Salafism is primarily focused on strict adherence to the Sharia and is also often associated with terrorist organizations.18
The stark ideological differences apparent in the belief system of
the Sufi majority and Salafi minority have created significant friction
relevant to understanding the development of Islamism in Somalia today.19 This section will explore the impact of this ideological friction on
the development of militant Islamism in Somalia from its largely innocuous and unfocused origins during the 1991 Somali civil war into AlShabaab, one of the most active and notorious contemporary terrorist
organizations.20 Additionally, this section will evaluate the scope and
effectiveness of Al-Qaeda’s efforts to propagate Salafist militant ideology in Somalia, which ran parallel to, but sometimes intersected with,
the historical development of Somali Islamism from the early 1990’s
through the present.21
14. Markus Virgil Hoehne, Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology, Counterterrorism in Somalia: How external influences helped to produce militant Islamism, CRISIS IN
THE HORN OF AFRICA, 1 (Dec. 17, 2009), http://webarchive.ssrc.org/Somalia_Hoehne_v10.pdf.
15. Id.; see George-Sebastian Holzer, Political Islam in Somalia: A Fertile Ground for Radical Islamic Groups?, 1 GEOPOLITICS OF THE MIDDLE E. 23 (June 2008), available at
http://www.operationspaix.net/DATA/DOCUMENT/5337~v~Political_Islam_in_Somalia__A_F
ertile_Ground_for_Radical_Islamic_Groups.pdf.
16. THE CTR. FOR SEC. POL’Y, TEAM ‘B’ II, SHARIAH: THE THREAT TO AMERICA, 2-3 (2010),
http://www.centerforsecuritypolicy.org/upload/wysiwyg/article%20pdfs/Shariah%20%20The%20Threat%20to%20America%20%28Team%20B%20Report%29%20Web%20Version
%2009302010.pdf.
17. For a definition of Islamism, see Hoehne, supra note 144, at 2.
18. Somalia’s
Islamists,
INT’L
CRISIS
GROUP
(Dec.
12,
2005),
http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/horn-of-africa/somalia/100-somalias-islamists.aspx.
19. Id. at 2.
20. See generally Jonathan Masters, Al-Shabaab, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS (Sept.
23, 2013), http://www.cfr.org/somalia/al-shabab/p18650.
21. See generally Clint Watts, Jacob Shapiro, & Vahid Brown, Al-Qa’ida’s (Mis) Adven-
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It is wise to approach this subject with a tabula rasa and disregard
any preconceived notion that the radically charged Islamist atmosphere
existing in Somalia today is indicative of the country’s cultural norm. 22
If one allows their views to be clouded by contemporary events, it is
easy to misestimate the varying historical motives and tenacity of Somali Islamist groups. Those who make this error often espouse the onedimensional theory that the existence of Islamist organizations and mere
presence of Al-Qaeda operations in the Horn of Africa during the
1990’s is sufficient to prove that Somalia served as a “fertile ground for
Al-Qaeda terrorism” in modern history.23 Those maintaining this belief
typically argue that this “fertile ground” was not only integral to the development of Somali Islamist organizations, but also supports the notion
that a meaningful nexus exists between Al-Shabaab and pre-9/11 AlQaeda.24 Although available support for this theory is far from dispositive, the existence of such a connection could profoundly impact the applicability of the AUMF to Al-Shabaab. As a result, understanding the
true nature of Somalia’s Islamist roots, particularly before 9/11, is necessary to perform a proper legal analysis of American contemporary use
of force against Al-Shabaab.
Part A will evaluate the birth and initial development of the Al Itihad Al Islam (AIAI) and Somali Islamism pre-9/11. Part B will discuss
the successes and failures of Al-Qaeda’s operations in Somalia during
this same period. Part C will outline the post-9/11 development of the
Islamic Courts Union (ICU) and the beginning of Islamist extremism.
Finally, Part D will explore the emergence of Al-Shabaab as a prominent terrorist group and consider the organization’s future intentions.
Dividing the history of Somali Islamism in this way will draw contrast
between the prevailing ideology and methodology during the pre- and
post- 9/11 periods. This in turn will lead to a better understanding of
how Al-Shabaab came into existence and provide clarity about the
AUMF’s applicability to this organization.

tures in the Horn of Africa, HARMONY PROJECT, WESTPOINT (July 2, 2007), available at
http://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/al-qaidas-misadventures-in-the-horn-of-africa.
22. Hoehne, supra note 14, at 1.4
23. Id.
24. Id.; see also James Phillips, Somalia and al-Qaeda: Implications for the War on Terrorism,
THE
HERITAGE
FOUND.
(Apr.
5,
2002),
available
at
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2002/04/somalia-and-al-qaeda-implications-for-the-waron-terrorism. This assumption will be important for application to the AUMF infra Part IV.
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1. The AIAI and Pre-9/11 Islamism
Prior to 1990, Islamism held minimal significance in Somali politics and culture.25 As mentioned, the vast majority of Somalis have historically identified themselves as Sufi Muslims, a group that holds contrasting views to the fundamentalist ideology promoted by Salafism.26
Additionally, Islamism was suppressed under the Somali Democratic
Republic headed by Mohamed Siyad Barre for much of the 20 th century.27 It was not until the civil war in 1991, which brought about the collapse of this government, that Islamism took root and began to emerge
(albeit largely ineffectively) as an ideology in Somalia.28
The primary Islamist organization that materialized from this civil
war was known as the AIAI.29 Religiously, the AIAI identified itself as
Salafist and promoted strict adherence to the Sharia.30 The religious and
ideological beliefs within the AIAI, however, were not uniform and
scholars have characterized the AIAI as an “umbrella organization” that
loosely unified the different Islamist sects in Somalia.31 Although largely diluted by clan politics and ideological differences, the fundamental
purpose of the AIAI was to establish an Islamist state in Somalia governed by strict adherence to Sharia law and to also reclaim Ogaden, a
contested territorial region bordering southwestern Somalia and Ethiopia.32
The AIAI gained initial success in establishing territorial presence;
they had convinced a number of Somalis in regions under their control
to embrace the Sharia.33 This success, however, was short lived and the
AIAI struggled to retain and expand power for four reasons. First, the
absence of a unified religious ideology weakened the AIAI’s foundation; this ultimately led to an internal schism in the mid-1990’s.34 Secondly, the AIAI as an organization was not impervious to the clan politics ubiquitous in Somali society;35 these clan ties, and the inevitable
25. See id. at 1-2.
26. Holzer, supra note 15, at 26.
27. Hoehne, supra note 14, at 2-3.
28. Id. at 3.
29. Holzer, supra note 15, at 26-27.
30. Id. .
31. Hoehne, supra note 14, at 3.
32. See Mapping Militant Organizations: Al Ittihad Al Islamiya, STAN. U.,
http://www.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/groups/view/99 (last visited Dec. 15,
2015).
33. Id.
34. Hoehne, supra note 14, at 4.
35. Id. at 3.
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conflicts they created, strongly degraded the cohesiveness within the
AIAI.36 Thirdly, the AIAI failed to gain the necessary public support; 37
this was partly because the organization failed to convey an impression
of strength or unity, but mostly because the AIAI adhered to a disfavored Islamist ideology.38 And lastly, the Sufi majority rejected the
AIAI’s interpretation of Sharia law because “its punishments . . . were
perceived as cruel and un-Somali.”39 While not an exhaustive list, these
detrimental factors created fissures within the AIAI that strongly undermined the organization’s foundation.
The AIAI tried to gain military and ideological strength in Somalia
throughout the 1990’s, but their efforts yielded little success. 40 After
several crushing military defeats, what little unity the AIAI enjoyed began crumbling as faction leaders acted unilaterally and turned their aggression toward reclaiming lost territory in Ethiopia.41 These fragmented
AIAI militant groups established bases in the Lu’uq and Ogaden regions
of southwestern Somalia, where they launched attacks against the Ethiopian government and its civilian targets.42 These attacks elicited an
overwhelming military backlash from the Ethiopian government and in
1996, the AIAI Islamists in Lu’uq and Ogaden were forced to abandon
their positions.43 Since the organization’s internal conflicts had already
placed the AIAI in a weakened state, the Ethiopian retaliation proved to
be a crippling blow.44
By 1996, nearly all unity within the AIAI dissolved and the organization faded from Somalia’s volatile political landscape.45 The failure
of the AIAI, however, did not prove fatal to Islamism in Somalia as a
whole. The legacy of the AIAI endured and ex-members—many of
whom were wealthy and influential—reemerged in prominent positions
within their communities.46 These ex-AIAI members created moderate
36. Id.; see also Holzer, supra note 15, at 27-28.
37. Hoehne, supra note 14, at 3.
38. Id. at 2-6; see also Mapping Militant Organizations: Al-Shabaab, STAN. U., available at
http://www.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/groups/view/61, (last visited Dec. 15,
2015).
39. Holzer, supra note 15, at 28.
40. Hoehne, supra note 14, at 3-4.
41. Watts et. al., supra note 20, at 35-36.
42. Id.; see also Holzer, supra note 15, at 28.
43. Watts et al., supra note 21, at 36; see also Holzer, supra note 15, at 28.
44. Id.
45. Hoehne, supra note 14 at 4; see also Holzer, supra note 15, at 28.
46. Watts et al., supra note 21, at 36.
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Sharia courts throughout Somalia that operated both as judicial and political institutions.47 As will be explained later, these new courts became
popular among Somalis who viewed them both as a semblance of order
in an otherwise order-less state and also as a means of retaliation against
external influence.48 This favorable shift in perception regarding the
Sharia courts was initially subtle, yet substantively important since
these courts would later serve as the foundation for Islamist resurgence
under the ICU.49
2. Beginning of Al-Qaeda Operations
Before continuing with the evolution of militant Islamism in Somalia, it is important to note how Al-Qaeda’s operations in the Horn of
Africa influenced the development of the AIAI in the 1990’s.50 According to Al-Qaeda documents (Harmony Documents) recently declassified
by the American government, it is well established that Al-Qaeda believed that the poverty and destabilization in the Horn of Africa would
encourage the establishment of an Islamist state from which Al-Qaeda
could expand their base of operation beyond the Arabian Peninsula.51
Al-Qaeda specifically targeted Somalia after the fall of the Siad
Barre regime in 1991, which left Somalia destabilized.52 The Harmony
Documents indicate that shortly after the onset of the 1991 civil war,
Al-Qaeda began operations in Somalia by sending agents to recruit
members, establish military camps, and propagate Jihadist ideology. 53
Despite these efforts, Al-Qaeda operatives found themselves unwelcome in Somalia and faced repeated unexpected hurdles that they were
ultimately unable to overcome.
The first hindrance to Al-Qaeda’s operations stemmed from the
Somalis’ unwavering clan loyalty and different ideological values.54
While these two factors may seem distinct they are actually intercon-

47. Holzer, supra note 15, at 29-30; see also Watts et al., supra note 21, at 36.
48. Watts et al., supra note 21 at 36; see also Hoehne, supra note 14, at 4-5.
49. Watts et al. supra note 21, at 36; see also Hoehne, supra note 14, at 29-30.
50. Watts et al., supra note 21, at 34-35.
51. Id. at 21.
52. Id. at 77-78.
53. Id. at 37-39; see also Sayf al-Islam, The Ogaden File: Operation Holding (Al-MSK),
Harmony Program AFGP-2002-600104, COMBATING TERRORISM CENTER AT WEST POINT (Jan.
26,
1993),
https://www.ctc.usma.edu/v2/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/The-Ogaden-FileOperation-Holding-Al-Msk_-Original.pdf (describing a document being sent by Al-Qaeda to the
Ogaden region of Ethiopia to construct training camps.).
54. Watts et al., supra note 21, at 37-39.
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nected.55 Nearly all Somali’s, including Salafists and Islamists are, first
and foremost, loyal to their clan.56 In its attempt to recruit Islamists from
the AIAI, Al-Qaeda was ill-prepared to deal with the complexities underscoring this clan-oriented mentality.57 Unlike the AIAI that temporarily managed to coexist with clan friction because of their homogeneity,
Al-Qaeda was perceived as foreign and intrusive.58 As a result, Somali
individuals who joined Al-Qaeda risked severe punishment or clan isolation because they were often perceived as having abandoned their
clan.59 Overcoming this clan identity proved to be such an obstacle to
Al-Qaeda’s efforts that operatives considered the elimination of clan
leaders to be second in priority to expelling western forces. 60 As AlQaeda quickly learned, the pecuniary and ideological benefits of joining
their organization did not outweigh the risk of “tribal exclusion” for
most Somalis and ultimately, the predominance of Somali tribal loyalties strongly contributed to the failure of Al-Qaeda’s recruitment efforts
during this period.61
The logistical and financial challenges that arose from functioning
in the “security vacuum” of Somalia comprised the second significant
hindrance to Al-Qaeda’s operations.62 This difficulty was demonstrated
in a letter from Abu Hafas, a prominent Al-Qaeda operative in Somalia,
where he stated, “we found out that it is difficult to do this in the areas
that we visited because of dangers pertaining to security. This is why it
is preferred that the courses be done by you in Khartoum. As a result

55. Id. at 29 (defines Clannism as “Somalia is a lineage-based society, where virtually all
members of society are identified in part by their clan family. Somali clannism is fluid, complex,
and frequently misunderstood. At the risk of oversimplification, one can make the case that
clannism– especially since the collapse of the state in 1991–forms the basis for most of the core
social institutions and norms of traditional Somali society, including personal identity, rights of
access to local resources, customary law (xeer), blood payment (diya) groups, and social support
systems.”)
56. Id.
57. Abu Belal, Abu Belal’s Report on Jihad in Somalia, Harmony Program AFGP-2002800640, COMBATING TERRORISM CENTER AT WEST POINT, http://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/abubelals-report-on-jihad-in-somalia-english-translation-2 (last visited Aug. 27, 2014); see also
Watts et. al., supra note 20, at 22.
58. Watts et al., supra note 21, at 22.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 6; Report on the Needs of the Mujahidin in Somalia, Harmony Program AFGP2002-800600, COMBATING TERRORISM CENTER AT WEST POINT (Feb. 19, 1993),
http://www.ctc.usma.edu/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/Report-on-the-Needs-of-the-Mujahidin-inSomalia-Partial-Translation.pdf.
61. Watts et al., supra note 21, at 22.
62. Id. at 14.
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this will save us transportation expenses and others.”63 This statement
demonstrates that maintaining security was unexpectedly expensive and
proved to be an impediment to Al-Qaeda’s operations. Furthermore,
poverty and poor infrastructure made obtaining and transporting supplies, weapons, and basic equipment in Somalia excessively difficult
and expensive.64 As a result, Al-Qaeda training camps were consistently
undersupplied and isolated.65 A letter from an unknown Al-Qaeda agent
pleading for assistance best expressed this frustration; according to him,
the training camps “start from nothing, and [is] in need of everything—
food, car, ammunitions and weapons.”66 Further exacerbating the situation, much of the supplies requested by Al-Qaeda operatives never arrived,67 and the supplies that did survive would often disappear into the
coffers of warlords by means of theft and extortion.68 Al-Qaeda operatives did not expect operational expenses in Somalia to be high, they also did not account for the Somali warlords and clan leaders’ uncooperative nature.69 These factors negatively impacted Al-Qaeda operations
and appeared to have contributed to Al-Qaeda’s ultimate failure in Somalia during this period.
The consistent theme underlying these two factors is that the destabilized atmosphere in Somalia, which Al-Qaeda believed to be advantageous to its operational capacity, actually proved to be an unanticipated obstacle. Navigating the complexities of Somalia’s clan-oriented
culture while financially covering the exorbitant cost of bribes and supplies, generated a far greater burden than Al-Qaeda had expected.70
These obstacles simply could not be overcome during the 1990’s, and
Somalia neither provided the “fertile grounds for Al-Qaeda terrorism”
nor the jihadist ideology they promoted.71 As a result, it is logical to
conclude that Somali Islamists were not closely aligned with Al-Qaeda

63. Id. at 15; see also Mapping Militant Organizations: Al Ittihad Al Islamiya, supra note
32.
64. Watts et al., supra note 21, at 15, 19-20.
65. Id. at 19-20.
66. Letters on Al-Qaeda’s Operations in Africa, Harmony Program AFGP-2002-800621,
COMBATING TERRORISM CENTER AT WEST POINT, http://www.ctc.usma.edu/wpcontent/uploads/2013/10/Letters-on-al-Qaida%E2%80%99s-Operations-in-AfricaTranslation1.pdf (last visited Aug. 27, 2014).
67. Watts et al., supra note 21, at 19.
68. Id. at 19-20.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 19-20.
71. Hoehne, supra note 14, at 1.
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during the 1990’s.72
3. Post 9/11 Islamism, the ICU, and the Transition into Terrorism
Despite the AIAI’s decline forcing Somali Islamists into a “rebuilding period” and Al-Qaeda operations in the region having fundamentally failed, America incorrectly presumed the existence of a strong
working relationship between Al-Qaeda and the AIAI.73 For example,
when Al-Qaeda claimed to have assisted in the battle of Mogadishu in
1993 and the U.S. Embassy attacks in Dar el Salaam and Nairobi in
1998, America assumed that Somali Islamists must have also contributed.74 There is, however, an utter lack of evidence demonstrating Somali
Islamist participation in the battle of Mogadishu, and “no one really
knows” if the AIAI was linked to the embassy bombings. 75 Casting further doubt on this presumed relationship is the fact that the AIAI had
been “defunct” since the above-mentioned 1996 Ethiopian incursion resulting from the AIAI’s violence in Ogaden.76 At that time, the AIAI
simply lacked the motivation and capacity to materially participate in
these attacks.77 In summation, there is insufficient evidence to link the
AIAI and Somali Islamists to Al-Qaeda terrorism and 9/11.
However, in the midst of the charged atmosphere surrounding the
aftermath of 9/11, America continued to overestimate Al-Qaeda’s relationship with the AIAI and Somali Islamists.78 For instance, America
mistakenly suspected that the Somali bank, Al-Barakaat, participated in
the financing of the 9/11 attacks.79 As a result, Somalia became a focal
point of American scrutiny, which prompted America to launch a joint
effort with Ethiopia to disrupt suspected terrorist activity. 80 In this joint
operation, America hired Somali warlords to target prominent Islamists
and persons believed to be affiliated with Al-Qaeda.81 On this note, recall that Islamism was not historically popular among the predominantly
72. Id..
73. Watts et al., supra note 21, at 38.
74. Holzer, supra note 15, at 28.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 28-29.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 37.
79. John Roth, Douglas Greenburg, & Serena Wille, Staff Report to Commission, Monograph on Terrorist Financing, NAT’L COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE U.S. 10,
82-84, http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/staff_statements/911_TerrFin_Monograph.pdf (last visited Sept. 26, 2014).
80. Hoehne, supra note 14, at 8.
81. Id.
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Sufi majority in Somalia. Nevertheless, America’s “dirty war” generated a great deal of Anti-American sentiment, which in turn engendered
support for the Sharia courts and Islamist ideology generally.82 This
public support bolstered the courts’ influence, and in 2006, eleven
prominent Sharia courts united and organized into the Islamic Courts
Union (ICU).83 It is difficult to determine with exact precision when the
remnants of the AIAI merged with the ICU, but it is clear that after 9/
11, the Sharia courts, and later, the ICU, operated as the primary Islamist institution in Somalia.84 Like the AIAI, the ICU served as an umbrella organization for a diversity of Islamist views; and while the bulk of
ICU factions were ideologically moderate, a small vein did practice
more militant extremism.85 Although this extremist network can trace
its roots back to 2003, it did not emerge as an essential component of
the ICU until 2006.”86
Despite the ICU’s predominantly moderate tendencies, America
imputed the violence of the extremist minoritiy to the organization as a
whole. This in turn perpetuated America’s belief that Somali Islamists
were intrinsically connected to Al-Qaeda .87 As a result, America escalated its operations in Somalia by launching the Alliance for Restoration
of Peace and Counter Terrorism (ARPCT) in 2006.88 The ARPCT was
another “dirty war” operation where American-funded warlords were
tasked with abducting suspected terrorists and curtailing Islamist influence in Mogadishu, the capital of Somalia.89 The ICU responded to this
domestic aggression with escalated force, and after several months of
intense fighting, the ICU gained total control of Mogadishu, which solidified their authority in Somalia.90
Further exacerbating the situation, in July 2006, Osama Bin Laden

82. Id. at 8-9.
83. Isaac Kfir, Islamic Radicalism in East Africa: Is There a Cause for Concern?, 31
STUDIES
IN
CONFLICT
&
TERRORISM
829,
842
(2008),
available
at
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10576100802291584#.Uq_vu2RDvN.
84. Id.
85. Hoehne, supra note 14, at 9.
86. Holzer, supra note 15, at 33.
87. Id.; see also Hoehne, supra note 14, at 10.
88. Holzer, supra note 15, at 34.
89. Hoehne, supra note 14, at 8.
90. BRONWYN E. BRUTON, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, SOMALIA: A NEW
APPROACH
7
(Special
Report
52,
Mar.
2010),
available
at
http://www.worldcat.org/wcpa/oclc/792737380?page=frame&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.cfr.org
%2Fcontent%2Fpublications%2Fattachments%2FSomalia_CSR52.pdf%26checksum%3D58462
1b9306f8aa15d495cc5eacb2eac&title=&linktype=digitalObject&detail.
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issued a message encouraging the ICU takeover and vocally threatening
backlash should any international intervention occur.91 While unsolicited by the ICU, Bin Laden’s statement only worsened America’s perception of Somali Islamists by bolstering the organization’s perceived relationship with Al-Qaeda.92 Rhetoric comparing the ICU to the Taliban
was common during 2006 despite the fact that Sheikh Sharif Sheikh
Ahmed, the leader of the ICU at this time, was widely regarded as a
“moderate.”93 America’s miscalculation of Al-Qaeda’s relationship with
the ICU is embodied in the official statement of Jendayi Frazer, the assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs during this time, in which
she declared that the ICU is now “controlled by al-Qaeda cell individuals. The top layer of the Court are extremists. They are terrorists.” 94 This
statement possessed only a kernel of truth. While some Islamists with
extremist tendencies transitioned from the AIAI to the ICU and ultimately to Al-Shabaab, these individuals represent the exception, not the
rule.95 Since the base majority of Somali Islamists held moderate beliefs, labeling Somali Islamists as terrorists and analogizing the ICU to
the Taliban served only to strengthen the extremist minority and further
elevate tension.96 To make matters worse, Ethiopia and the recently
ousted Transitional Federal Government (TFG), also perceived the
growing strength of the ICU as a serious threat, causing the TFG to
happily follow the United States’ lead in adopting rhetoric artificially
linking Somali Islamists to Al-Qaeda.97
In December of 2006, Ethiopia launched an American-supported
invasion that wrestled away control of Mogadishu from the ICU. 98 Ultimately, the ICU’s military capacity lacked endurance and the Ethiopi-

91. Hoehne, supra note 14, at 10.
92. Id. at 10-11.
93. Id. at 1, 10, 25. See Kfir, supra note 83, at 842 (for an example of Taliban ICU comparison).
94. Gwynne Dyer, Somalia: Back to Perpetual War, GWYNNE DYER (Mar. 10, 2007),
http://gwynnedyer.com/tag/uic/.
95. See Watts et al., supra note 21, at 113, 131.
96. Hoehne, supra note 144, at 25.
97. This was demonstrated in a formal 2006 letter to the Monitoring Group on Somalia in
which Ethiopian officials emphatically asserted that “[t]he Horn of Africa region is currently the
target of active destabilization by dangerous international terrorist groups.” See Letter from
Dawit Yohannes, Ambassador of Ethiopia, to Monitoring Group on Somalia (Oct. 9, 2006), reprinted in U.N. S.C. Rep. of the Monitoring Group on Somalia, Nov. 22, 2006, U.N. Doc.
S/2006/913,
Annex
X,
available
at
http://www.fas.org/asmp/resources/govern/109th/S2006913.pdf.
98. Hoehne, supra note 144, at 20, 25.
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an occupation successfully forced the ICU’s descent from prominence.99
4. Rise of Al-Shabaab
Although the ICU was only in power for one year, the organizations meteoric rise and decline had a radicalizing effect that generated
nationalist sentiment among many Somalis and established credibility
for the Islamist movement.100 This in turn opened the door for jihadist
extremist factions to emerge from the remnants of the ICU, the most
prominent of which would become known as the youth movement—AlShabaab.101 As the ICU declined, Al-Shabaab jihadists remained resilient and employed unconventional warfare and terrorist tactics against
Ethiopian and TFG targets.102 In addition, the residual public support for
the ICU was shifted to Al-Shabaab and as outrage toward the Ethiopian
occupation grew, so too did Al-Shabaab’s level of public support.103
Since 2006, Al-Shabaab has emerged as the predominant Somali
Islamist organization.104 In 2008, America officially declared AlShabaab to be a terrorist organization and began conducting military
operations.105 Despite Al-Shabaab’s continued increase in power and influence, it is important to note that the organization does not enjoy universal favor among the Somali people.106 While some Somalis credit AlShabaab with improved regional security and stability, many actually
criticize Al-Shabaab’s ruthless recruitment tactics, punishments, and
over-zealous religious mandates.107
While instances of Al-Shabaab’s violence have remained mostly
localized in the Horn of Africa, the nature of their aggressive tactics
may indicate that the organization is transitioning into an expansive international threat.108 The most concerning of these tactics has been Al99. Hoehne, supra note 14, at 1.
100. Hoehne, supra note 144, at 9-11.
101. Id. at 12, 17-18; see also Watts et al., supra note 21, at 36.
102. Masters, supra note 20.
103. Id.; see also Mapping Militant Organizations: Al Ittihad Al Islamiya, supra note 32.
104. Masters, supra note 20.
105. Id.
106. Mapping Militant Organizations: Al Shabaab, supra note 38.
107. Id.; Mohamed Mohamed, Somali Justice – Islamist Style, BBC (May 20, 2009, 8:55
AM), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/8057179.stm. For example, Al-Shabaab’s requirement that
women wear the traditional hijab and be fully covered at all times in public is greatly disfavored;
these practices are foreign to Somali culture and counterproductive in the agrarian economy of
rural Somalia.
108. See Mapping Militant Organizations: Al Shabaab, supra note 386 (specifically, in December 2010 an Al-Shabaab official stated that the group “would attack the U.S. if President
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Shabaab’s effective use of the Internet and social media websites, such
as Twitter, to recruit foreigners into their ranks.109 Americans comprise
a substantial portion of foreign enlistments; it is estimated that from
2007 to 2010, Al-Shabaab had recruited more than forty Americans
from Somali communities in Phoenix and Minneapolis to join their
cause.110 Not only is this a novel method to spread jihadist propaganda,
but it also presents a dangerous means of infiltration that could potentially produce catastrophic results. This threat of catastrophe nearly
manifested itself in 2009 when the Australian government thwarted an
attack on the Holsworthy Army Barracks in Sydney meant to be executed by Australian Somalis connected to Al-Shabaab.111
Although Al-Shabaab is a prominent international terrorist organization, the extent of Al-Shabbab’s connection with Al-Qaeda remains
unclear.112 Although Al-Shabaab’s former leader, Mukhtar Abu alZubair, vocally pledged allegiance to Al-Qaeda in 2012, there is no indication that Al-Shabaab has wavered from its primary goal of “[turning] Somalia into a Shabab-ville where strict Islamic law rules everything,”113 Nonetheless, the future plans of Al-Shabaab remain unknown
and only time will tell whether this terrorist organization will continue
focusing its efforts within the Horn of Africa or if it is poised to act internationally.
III. AL-SHABBAB TODAY
The landscape of international Islamist terrorism is presently in
flux. In the 2011 Report on Terrorism, the State Department concluded
that the loss of Osama Bin Laden and the death of other prominent leadership has forced Al-Qaeda “on a path of decline that will be difficult to
Obama refuses to embrace Islam.”).
109. Seth G. Jones, The Terrorist Threat From Al Shabaab, RAND CORP. 5 (Oct. 3, 2013),
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/testimonies/CT400/CT400/RAND_CT400.pdf.
110. Id. at 3.
111. The enemy within: al-Shabab in Australia, AUSTRALIAN NEWS COMMENT,
http://australian-news.net/articles/view.php?id=148 (last visited Sept. 25, 2014); see also AlShabaab’s
American
Recruits,
ANTI-DEFAMATION
LEAGUE
2
(Oct.
2013),
http://www.adl.org/assets/pdf/combating-hate/al-shabaabs-american-recruits.pdf.
112. Mapping Militant Organizations: Al-Shabaab, supra note 38.
113. Id.; see also Mapping Militant Organizations: Al Shabaab, supra note 38; CNN Wire
Staff, Al-Shabaab Joining Al-Qaeda, monitor group says, CNN WORLD (Feb. 10, 2010, 1:07
AM), http://www.cnn.com/2012/02/09/world/africa/somalia-shabaab-qaeda/. (Mukhtar Abu alZubair stated: “[o]n behalf of the soldiers and the commanders in al-Shabaab, we pledge allegiance to you. So lead us to the path of jihad and martyrdom that was drawn by our imam, the
martyr Osama.”)
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reverse.”114 In direct contrast, that same report focused in depth on the
emergence of Al-Shabaab and described Al-Shabaab as possessing the
“willingness and ability to conduct attacks outside of Somalia.”115
While it is unclear whether Al-Qaeda truly is in decline,116 the emphasis this report placed on Al-Shabaab is indicative of America’s
growing apprehension towards the rapid development of this young, yet
increasingly aggressive, terrorist organization.117 This concern has
gained momentum and was especially relevant following Al-Shabaab’s
attack on a Nairobi mall that resulted in at least sixty-seven deaths on
September 21, 2013.118 Further complicating matters was the revelation
that several Americans who joined Al-Shabaab participated in the attack.119
America’s response to this act of terror was both immediate and
forceful. On October 5, 2013, American Navy SEALs conducted a raid
on an Al-Shabaab compound in a failed attempt to capture a senior official in the group.120 On October 29, 2013, an American drone strike
killed two Al-Shabaab officials, including a top explosives expert.121 It
is important to note that these examples are not isolated instances of
forceful incursion. America has been openly conducting military operations against Al-Shabaab long before the organization gained the level
of international notoriety it presently holds. 122

114. BUREAU OF COUNTERTERRORISM, supra note 4, at 5.
115. Id.
116. See generally Brian Michael Jenkins, Al Qaeda in Its Third Decade: Irreversible Decline
or
Imminent
Victory?,
RAND
CORP.
(2012),
http://www.rand.org/pubs/occasional_papers/OP362.html.
117. Id.
118. Kenya mall attack terrorists included “two or three” Americans, Kenyan foreign minister
Amina
Mohamed
says,
CBS
NEWS
(Sept.
24,
2013,
1:18
AM),
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/kenya-mall-attack-terrorists-included-two-or-three-americanskenyan-foreign-minister-amina-mohamed-says/ [hereinafter Kenya mall attack included Americans].
119. Id.; Lisa Millar, Fears Al Shabaab a significant global terror threat, ABC NEWS (Sept.
23, 2013, 8:30 AM), http://www.abc.net.au/news/2013-09-23/fears-al-shabaab-a-significantglobal-terror-threat/4974224; see also Al-Shabaab’s American Recruits, supra note 111, at 2-5.
120. Abdalle Ahmed, Spencer Ackerman & David Smith, How the US raid on al-Shabaab in
Somalia
went
wrong,
THE
GUARDIAN
(Oct.
9,
2013,
8:35
AM),
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/09/us-raid-al-shabaab-somalia-navy-seals.
121. David Smith, US drone strike in Somalia kills top al-Shabaab explosives expert, THE
GUARDIAN (Oct. 29, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/29/us-drone-strikesomalia-al-shabaab-expert.
122. Woods, supra note 10.
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IV. LEGAL ANALYSIS
The sole fact that Al-Shabaab is suspected of committing acts of
terror does not by itself validate American drone and military strikes
under domestic law. Although an official legal rationale for these strikes
has never been promulgated, it has been strongly suggested that American officials believe Al-Shabaab falls within the authority granted by
Congress in the 2001 AUMF.123 This section will evaluate the validity
of this belief by testing the applicability of the AUMF as well as the legally precarious Associated Forces expansion to Al-Shabaab. This discussion will comprehensively analyze and demonstrate that Al-Shabaab
does not fulfill the AUMF’s requirements. Therefore, authorizing military force against Al-Shabaab under the Associated Forces interpretation not only produces inconsistent results, but also raises serious legal
questions. The ultimate purpose of this analysis is not narrowly focused
on the legality of American use of force against Al-Shabaab. Rather, AlShabaab is merely a case study used to scrutinize the AUMF’s viability
in confronting this new generation of terrorist organizations.
Furthermore, none of this analysis is meant to imply that AlShabaab is harmless. On the contrary, Al-Shabaab’s violent proclivities
and proven ability to recruit American citizens into its ranks presents
deeply troubling security concerns.124 Even this, however, is no excuse
for extralegal military action, and for the sake of transparency and credibility, America should cease these military strikes or congressionally
evolve the AUMF to encompass Al-Shabaab and other emerging terrorist threats.
Part A will begin by providing a brief overview of the AUMF and
how it has been applied during its lifetime. Part B will discuss the legislative history and subsequent application of the AUMF as well as explore the development of the expansive Associated Forces interpretation. Part C will conclude with an analytical comparison of the AUMF’s
application to Al-Qaeda versus the AUMF’s application to Al-Shabaab.
The purpose of this comparison is to illustrate a stark contrast and ultimately demonstrate that Al-Shabaab does not comfortably fall within
any interpretation of the AUMF.

123. Bill Roggio, US justifies Somalia raid under AUMF, which Obama seeks to repeal, THE
LONG
WAR
J.
(Oct.
8,
2013),
http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2013/10/us_justifies_somalia.php.
124. Jones, supra note 109, at 5.
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1. The AUMF
In response to Al-Qaeda’s terrorist attack on the Pentagon and
World Trade Center, the AUMF, which Congress passed into law on
September 18, 2001, provides:
“That the President is authorized to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines
planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism
against the United States by such nations, organizations or persons.”125
While clearly authorizing military action against Al-Qaeda and
those responsible for 9/11, the AUMF, which remains unchanged after
twelve years of conflict, has outgrown its purpose and seemingly
evolved into a catchall justification for drone strikes against any Islamist organization with a proclivity towards terrorism. 126 Al-Shabaab is
one such organization, and the use of AUMF language in conjunction
with American drone and military strikes in Somalia strongly suggests
that American officials believe that Al-Shabaab falls under the
AUMF.127 However, this broad application of the AUMF contradicts the
express scope and language of the statute. On its face, the AUMF’s limiting language and intentional use of the past tense narrowly construes
authorization of force towards those persons, groups, or nations with
some nexus to the 9/11 attacks.128 As will be demonstrated in the subsequent analysis, Al-Shabaab lacks the requisite 9/11 connection, therefore, asserting the AUMF as justification for military strikes against AlShabaab is in clear violation of the statute’s plain language.
This, however, is not the end of the analysis. During its extended
life, the AUMF has found itself subject to gratuitous presidential interpretation that has expanded authorization to also encompass Associated
Forces.129 Regardless of the fact that this questionable expansion re125. Authorization for Use of Military Force, supra note 2, § 2(a).
126. See Roggio, supra note 106; see also Maria Newman, Bin Laden Takes Responsibility
for
9/11
Attacks
in
New
Tape, N.
Y.
TIMES (Oct.
29,
2004), http://www.nytimes.com/2004/10/29/international/30osamaCND.html?_r=0.
127. See id.
128. RICHARD F. GRIMMETT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS22357, AUTHORIZATION FOR USE
OF MILITARY FORCE IN RESPONSE TO THE 9/11 ATTACKS (P.L. 107-40): LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
2 (2007), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RS22357.pdf; see also Interview with
David Glazier, Int’l Law Professor, Loyola Law School, in L.A., Cal. (Sept. 20, 2013) (discussing
the importance of tense in the AUMF).
129. Hamlily v. Obama, 616 F. Supp. 2d 63, 74 (D.D.C. 2009).
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mains entirely absent from the original language of the AUMF, alleged
terrorist organizations are ostensibly labeled as Associated Forces and
somehow shoehorned into the parameters of the AUMF.130
2. The History of the AUMF
If the meaning of a statute is not clear from the plain language,
meaning may also be derived from an analysis of the drafters’ intent, the
statute’s subsequent interpretive application, and an examination of the
statute’s legislative history. 131 While the language of the AUMF does
not appear to be ambiguous, an evaluation of these factors is helpful to
establish context and discover any implied authorization that may exist.
By design, no formal reports on the AUMF’s legislative process
were produced.132 However, comparing the language differences in each
draft, can provide clarity as to the meaning behind the words.133 The initial AUMF drafts proposed by the White House sought presidential authorization “to deter and pre-empt any future acts of terrorism or aggression against the United States.”134 The lack of clear target and
durational parameters in this language raised controversy. 135 As Representative DeFazio argued on the floor: “[t]he earlier drafts ceded too
much authority to the executive branch.”136 The congressional majority
agreed with this notion, and the overly broad language in these early
White House drafts was ultimately rejected by Congress in the final
draft, which instead authorized the President “to use all necessary and
appropriate force” in pursuit of those responsible for 9/11.137 This revision makes it clear that Congress did not intend to provide broad and
all-encompassing authorization for the President to confront all future
terrorist threats with force.138 To the contrary, Congress clearly intended
130. Lauren Harper, Want to Know Who the US is at War With? Too Bad, Says Pentagon,
NAT’L SECURITY ARCHIVE (Sept. 4, 2013), http://nsarchive.wordpress.com/2013/09/04/want-toknow-who-the-us-is-at-war-with-too-bad-says-pentagon/ (discussing how the list of “Associated
Forces” remains classified. According to the Department of Defense, revealing the list could
cause “serious damage to Security.”).
131. For a description of Statutory Construction, see 48A FLA. JUR. 2D Statutes § 113 (2014).
132. GRIMMETT, supra note 128, at 2.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 2-3.
136. Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Congressional Authorization and the War on
Terrorism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2047 n.134 (2005).
137. Jonathan Masters, Targeted Killings, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. (May 23, 2010),
http://www.cfr.org/counterterrorism/targeted-killings/p9627.
138. GRIMMETT, supra note 128, at 2.
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to limit the AUMF to individuals, organizations, and nations that had
some ascertainable connection to the 9/11 attacks.139 As Representative
Udall summarily noted: “[the AUMF] is broad, but it is not unlimited. It
covers the culpable but it is not aimed at anyone else. In other words, in
voting for this resolution, I am voting not for vengeance but for justice.”140
Congress’s clear limiting intent did not insulate the AUMF from
gratuitous interpretation. On September 20, 2011, just two days after the
AUMF was codified, President Bush proclaimed: “[o]ur enemy is a radical network of terrorists, and every government that supports them. Our
war on terror begins with al Qaeda, but it does not end there. It will not
end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped
and defeated.”141 This broad generalization of an “unbound war” against
terrorism stands in stark contrast to the congressional intent encapsulated in the plain language of the AUMF. 142 Indeed, President Bush’s
statement seems to more readily coincide with the White House’s proposed authorization—”to deter and pre-empt any future acts of terrorism
or aggression against the United States”—which was specifically rejected by Congress in favor of more limiting language.143
When evaluating whether President Bush’s broad characterization
of the AUMF possibly passes judicial muster, we are guided by Justice
Jackson’s famous, yet admittedly oversimplified, classifications of presidential power from his concurring opinion in Youngstown Sheet &
Tube Co. v. Sawyer.144 Justice Jackson’s concurrence provides that “the
strongest of presumptions and the widest latitude of judicial interpretation” attach “[w]hen the President acts pursuant to an express or implied
authorization of Congress.”145 Some have argued that because Congress
expressly authorized the President “to use all necessary and appropriate
force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines
planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001,”146 the President is awarded “the strong139. Id.
140. 147 CONG. REC 120, H5671, para. 3 (daily ed. Sept. 14, 2001), available
at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CREC-2001-09-14/pdf/CREC-2001-09-14-pt1-PgH5638-4.pdf.
141. Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 136, at 2049.
142. Id. at 2049-52.
143. GRIMMETT, supra note 128, at 2-3.
144. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).
145. Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 136, at 2050; see also Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co.,
343 U.S. at 635, 637.
146. Authorization for Use of Military Force, supra note 2, § 2(a)
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est presumption and the widest latitude” to make these arguably unreviewable determinations as he sees fit. 147 This argument, however, fails
to consider Jackson’s Category 3, which provides that “[w]hen the President takes measures incompatible with the expressed or implied will of
Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb . . . .”148 As clearly indicated in
the AUMF’s drafting process and floor debates, Congress expressly intended the AUMF to be constrained only to those “nations, organizations, or persons” with a nexus to the 9/11 attacks.149 Thus, construing
this limited authorization expansively is “incompatible with the expressed or implied will of Congress” and therefore President Bush’s
broad interpretation should be categorically rejected.150
However, in the wake of 9/11, President Bush’s broad characterization of the AUMF was largely ignored because all the initial targets at
that time clearly possessed the requisite 9/11 nexus and thus comfortably fell within the express authorization granted by Congress. Nevertheless, the residual effects were profound and President Bush’s expansive
interpretation of the AUMF, made only days after its enactment, set
precedent for broad Presidential interpretation inconsistent with the intended scope of the AUMF’s Congressional authorization.
3. Development of the Associated Forces Expansion
Application of the AUMF to the War on Terror quickly proved to
be problematic.151 While the AUMF gave the President authorization to
use “all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001,” 152 actual
application of the conventional wartime terminology to the amorphous
and far from conventional War on Terror proved challenging. For example, in Afghanistan, Al-Qaeda was so interwoven with the Taliban
and general populace that it proved difficult to simply identify and de147. Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 140, at 2050, 2082.
148. Id. at 2050; Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 343 U.S. at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring).
149. S.J. Res. 23, § 2(a).
150. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 343 U.S. at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring).
151. Detention of Enemy Combatants Act, H.R. 1076, 109th Cong. (2005) (explaining that
“The term ‘enemy combatant’ has historically referred to all of the citizens of a state with which
the Nation is at war, and who are members of the armed force of that enemy state. Enemy combatants in the present conflict, however, come from many nations, wear no uniforms, and use unconventional weapons. Enemy combatants in the war on terrorism are not defined by simple,
readily apparent criteria, such as citizenship or military uniform. And the power to name a citizen
as an ‘enemy combatant’ is therefore extraordinarily broad.”)
152. Id.; S.J. Res. 23, § 2(a).
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fine an individual’s capacity in the hostilities.153
In an attempt to alleviate this problem, President Bush issued a
military order on November 13, 2001. Section 2 of this order provided
that detention authority extended to individuals if:
“(1) there is reason to believe that such individual, at the relevant
times,
(i) is or was a member of the organization known as [Al-Qaeda];
(ii) has engaged in, aided or abetted, or conspired to commit, acts
of international terrorism, or acts in preparation therefor[e], that have
caused, threaten to cause, or have as their aim to cause, injury to or adverse effects on the United States, its citizens, national security, foreign
policy, or economy; or
(iii) has knowingly harbored one or more individuals described in
subparagraphs (i) or (ii) of subsection 2(a)(1) of this order; and
(2) it is in the interest of the United States that such individual be
subject to this order.”154
It is important to note that this order treated all detainees as “enemy combatants” subject to trial by military tribunals without application
of the rules of evidence.155
The parameters for detention authority set forth in section 2 of the
order do not, in isolation, seem problematic. The language of the military order was largely adopted from the AUMF and the acceptable detainees under this order possess a nexus to Al-Qaeda.156 While this may
be true, the budding expansion to the AUMF did not reside within the
express language of the order, but rather in the addition of the category
Associated Forces, which appeared in the definition of “enemy combatant” on all the Combatant Status Review Tribunal (CSRT) forms:
An enemy combatant has been defined as “an individual who was
part of or supporting the Taliban or [Al-Qaeda] forces, or associated
forces that are engaged in hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners. This includes any person who committed a belligerent
act or has directly supported hostilities in aid of enemy armed forces. 157
153. See Detention of Enemy Combatants Act, supra note 151.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Compare Detention of Enemy Combatants Act, supra note 151 (language) with S.J. Res.
23. At this point Al-Qaeda was known to be the “nations, organizations, or persons [that]
planned, authorized, [and] committed, the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001.”
See also Graham Cronogue, A New AUMF: Defining Combatants in the War on Terror, 22 DUKE
J. COMP. & INT’L L. 377, 378 (2012) (emphasis added).
157. Combatant Status Review Board, Summary of Evidence for Combatant Status Review
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As will be discussed below, the inclusion of Associated Forces to
the “enemy combatant” umbrella expanded the parameters of the War
on Terror beyond what the AUMF originally authorized. Nevertheless,
the Associated Forces terminology received legislative support and was
incorporated by Congress in the Military Commissions Act of 2006 and
later again in the 2012 National Defense Authorization Act.158
In the 2009 case Hamlily v. Obama, the D.C. Circuit affirmed the
addition of Associated Forces with respect to the governments’ detention authority over alleged enemy combatants.159 In its holding, the court
provided that such authority extended to Al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and
their “Associated Forces.”160 The court defined Associated Forces as
“co-belligerents” operating in conjunction with the goals of Al-Qaeda
and the Taliban.161 In effect, the addition of Associated Forces in the
Hamlily holding supported the assertion that America’s detention authority was not wholly constrained by the AUMF’s express limitations.162
When President Obama took office in 2009, he vocally rejected the
War on Terror and its attendant terminology popularized by the prior
administration.163 However, this rejection later proved to be hollow as
AUMF authorization has further expanded under his administration’s
watch.164 Of particular note, President Obama’s administration has embraced the Associated Forces terminology, which was previously only
applied in detention authority cases, and shoehorned the label into the
umbrella of AUMF targets against which America is authorized to use
lethal force.165
This expansion was clearly demonstrated in the Department of Justice’s White Paper, which was allegedly leaked to the press on February
Tribunal,
U.S
DEP’T
OF
DEFENSE
(Aug.
7,
2004),
http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/operation_and_plans/Detainee/detainees.pdf (emphasis added).
158. See Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, § 948(a), 120 Stat. 2600,
available at http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/PL-109-366.pdf; see also National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-81, § 1021(b)(2), 125 Stat. 1298
(2011), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-112publ81/pdf/PLAW-112publ81.pdf.
159. Hamlily v. Obama, 616 F. Supp. 2d 63, 74 (D.D.C. 2009).
160. Id.
161. Id. at 70.
162. Id.; see also Combatant Status Review Board, supra note 157.
163. Daniel Halper, Obama Rejects ‘Global War on Terror,’ THE WEEKLY STANDARD, (May
23, 2013, 2:04 PM), http://www.weeklystandard.com/blogs/obama-rejects-global-warterror_728944.html.
164. See Peter Baker, Obama’s War Over Terror, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 4, 2010),
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/17/magazine/17Terror-t.html?pagewanted=all&_r=1&.
165. Cronogue, supra note 156, at 378, 393-95.
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4, 2013 in response to the controversy surrounding the killing of Anwar
Al-Awlaki, and American citizen.166 The White Paper outlined the legality of American international use of force and conspicuously included
Associated Forces in conjunction with the AUMF authorization language: “[t]he President has authority to respond to the imminent threat
posed by [Al-Qaeda] and its Associated Forces . . . [with] Congress’s
authorization of the use of all necessary and appropriate military force
against this enemy.”167 President Obama corroborated this expansion of
Associated Forces in a speech given to the National Defense University
on May 23, 2013: “America’s actions are legal. We were attacked on 9/
11. Within a week, Congress overwhelmingly authorized the use of
force. Under domestic law, and international law, the United States is at
war with al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and their associated forces.”168 Furthermore, in a speech given on November 30, 2012, Jeh Johnson, General
Council for the Department of Defense from 2009 to 2012, stated:
“[t]he United States government is in an armed conflict against al Qaeda
and associated forces, to which the laws of armed conflict apply.”169
How Associated Forces became acceptable targets in America’s
War on Terror is puzzling and there has been surprisingly little discussion about how this expansion is legally permissible. 170 Nonetheless, the
prior examples clearly indicate that the Associated Forces label has
been constructively imputed into the framework of the AUMF despite
the fact that this expansion contradicts the statute’s intended scope of
authorization.171
166. Michael Isikoff, Justice Department memo reveals legal case for drone strikes on Americans,
NBC
NEWS
(Feb.
4,
2013,
5:57
PM),
http://investigations.nbcnews.com/_news/2013/02/04/16843014-justice-department-memoreveals-legal-case-for-drone-strikes-on-americans
(explaining that Anwar Al-Awlaki was an American citizen that allegedly joined the Al-Qaeda
branch in Yemin and was killed by a drone strike).
167. Department of Justice, White Paper: Lawfulness of a Lethal Operation Directed Against
a U.S. Citizen Who Is a Senior Operational Leader of Al-Qa’ida or An Associated Force,
MSNBC,
available
at
http://msnbcmedia.msn.com/i/msnbc/sections/news/020413_DOJ_White_Paper.pdf (last visited
Sept. 25, 2014) (emphasis added).
168. Obama’s Remarks, supra note 1.
169. Jeh Johnson, Gen. Counsel of the Dep’t of Def., Speech at Oxford Union (Feb. 30,
2012), available at http://www.lawfareblog.com/2012/11/jeh-johnson-speech-at-the-oxfordunion/#_ftn11 (emphasis added).
170. Daskal & Vladeck, supra note 3, at 123.
171. Additionally, if the United States purports to abide by international law, then Associated
Forces that have not engaged in hostilities against the United States are not legally permissible
targets. While the details of international law fall outside the scope of this discussion, it is worth
noting that the AUMF is essentially domestic legal recognition that America is involved in an
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4. Analysis: Is Al-Shabaab an Authorized Adversary Under the AUMF?
After considering the plain language of the AUMF, its legislative
history, and its recent application, it is appropriate to determine whether
Al-Shabaab is subsumed under AUMF authorization. In answering this
question, it is beneficial to first show the proper function of an AUMF
application. Thus, each of the substantive elements in the AUMF will be
delineated and briefly applied to clearly acceptable targets—Al-Qaeda
and the Taliban.172 Such an application will benefit later analysis by
demonstrating an applicable standard under the plain language of the
AUMF that will be subsequently compared to Al-Shabaab.
The first element of the AUMF states, “[t]hat the President is authorized to use all necessary and appropriate force.”173 As a preliminary
matter, this language presumably encompasses drone and Special Forces strikes because these attacks have proven to be a highly successful
and efficient means of combating terrorist organizations.174 Additionally, common sense indicates that surgical military strikes result in less
cumulative loss of life than utilizing American soldiers in traditional
combat roles. Indeed, if these surgical strikes do not constitute “necessary and appropriate force,” then this AUMF element is effectively rendered useless. Of course, these strikes are not without controversy.
Drone strikes in particular present substantial legal and ethical concern.175 However, these concerns fall outside the scope of this analysis
and America’s military strikes will be presumed “necessary and appropriate” when applied to Al-Qaeda and Al-Shabaab.176
The second element authorizes force against “those nations, organizations, or persons [the President] determines planned, authorized,
committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11,
2001, or harbored such organizations or persons.”177 This element, hereinafter the Authorized Adversary element, clearly encompasses—if not

armed conflict with Al-Qaeda, a group that engaged in sufficiently intense hostilities to justify the
existence of an armed conflict under article 51 of the UN charter. However, associated forces that
have never engaged in hostilities against the United States, such as Al-Shabaab, cannot be considered part of this armed conflict, and they cannot be included simply out of convenience. See
Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 136, at 2067-70, 2089-91.
172. Cronogue, supra note 156, at 378.
173. Authorization for Use of Military Force, supra note 2, § 2(a).
174. McDonnell, supra note 9, at 249, 279.
175. See generally McDonnell, supra note 9.
176. Id. at 264; see also S.J. Res. 23, § 2(a), § 2(a).
177. S.J. Res. 23, § 2(a).
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expressly targets—both Al-Qaeda and the Taliban.178 Al-Qaeda represents the organization that both planned and committed the 9/11 attacks
while the Taliban in Afghanistan represents the government that harbored Al-Qaeda both before and after the attack.179
The final AUMF element establishes the purpose of the AUMF:
“in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the
United States by such nations, organizations or persons.” 180 According
to this Purpose element, for a target to fall within the AUMF’s umbrella, it must pose a future threat of terrorism to the United States. 181 AlQaeda cleanly fulfills this requirement because the organization openly
promotes a jihadist anti-American ideology and has demonstrated its
ability to commit acts of terror against the United States.
The Purpose element, however, may additionally serve as a temporal limit that logically expires when the terrorist organization at issue
no longer poses a threat of “international terrorism” against the United
States.182 As indicated in America’s 2011 Country Report on Terrorism,
many believed that the death of Osama Bin Laden coupled with America’s constant military pressure forced Al-Qaeda on a “path of decline
that will be difficult to reverse.”183 Consequently, it can be argued that
the degradation of Al-Qaeda’s power in recent years has crippled the
organization beyond effective operational capacity and thus the
AUMF’s self-contained “sunset provision” should be invoked.184
As Al-Qaeda was the primary culprit responsible for the 9/11 attacks and thus the focus of the American military response. Thus, it is to
be expected that the organization, at least for a time, comfortably satis178. Cronogue, supra note 156, at 378.
179. See generally Newman, supra note 126; K. ALAN KRONSTADT & KENNETH KATZMAN,
CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS, ISLAMIST MILITANCY IN THE PAKISTAN-AFGHANISTAN BORDER
REGION AND U.S. POLICY (R.L. 34763) (Nov. 21, 2008), available at
http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/113202.pdf (summary); see also Barack Obama,
President of the United States, Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation on the Way
Forward
in
Afghanistan
and
Pakistan
(Dec.
1,
2009),
available
at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-address-nation-way-forwardafghanistan-and-pakistan.
180. S.J. Res. 23, § 2(a).
181. Bradley & Goldsmith, supra 140, at 2072, 2111 (the methodology of fragmenting the
AUMF into elements was adopted from this source).
182. Interview with David Glazier, supra note 128.
183. BUREAU OF COUNTERTERRORISM, supra note 4, at 5.
184. This is an argument to fully explore in another discussion, but it is worth mentioning
here because the inclusion of this “sunset provision” in the AUMF lends additional support to the
notion that Congress did not intend the AUMF to authorize a broad and unbound war on terror.
For a discussion on this subject, see Daskal & Vladeck, supra note 3, at 18-19.
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fied the AUMF’s three elements.185 Application of these elements to
present day Islamist organizations, however, is not so clear. As the nexus between 9/11 and present day terrorist organizations has diminished,
so too have the acceptable targets become less obvious. 186 The terrorist
organization Al-Shabaab represents a prime example of this dilemma,
and when one attempts to shoehorn Al-Shabaab into AUMF authorization, it becomes immediately apparent that such an application is problematic.
The first major issue generated by this application arises from the
Authorized Adversary language in the second element of the AUMF.
Congress specified a very narrow demographic by using past tense in
the statute’s plain language to authorize the use of force against “those
nations, organizations, or persons [the President] determines planned,
authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on
September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons.”187 This
demographic does not include Al-Shabaab, quite simply, because AlShabaab did not exist on September 11, 2001.188 As demonstrated in
Section II of this article, Al-Shabaab emerged from the remnants of the
ICU in 2006—five years after the 9/11 attacks.189 Thus Al-Shabaab, as
an independent entity, could neither have assisted Al-Qaeda nor participated in the attacks in any meaningful way. For this single reason it
could be strongly argued that Al-Shabaab fails to satisfy the Authorized
Adversary element of the AUMF.
This conclusion, however, is predicated on a literal reading of the
Authorized Adversary element. A creative advocate of broad AUMF interpretation may attempt to exploit Al-Shabaab’s history by arguing that
authorization can be derived from previous Somali Islamist organizations.190 This theory would contend that because Al-Shabaab’s roots are
interconnected with prior Somali Islamist organizations, and some extremist members of Al-Shabaab were also once members of the ICU
and the AIAI, any connection drawn between these preceding Islamist
organizations and pre-9/11 Al-Qaeda should be imputed to Al185. Newman, supra note 126.
186. Cronogue, supra note 156, at 378.
187. Id.
188. See supra text accompanying notes 81-87.
189. See supra text accompanying notes 81-87, 98-102.
190. For a similar argument, see James Phillips, Somalia and al-Qaeda: Implications for the
War
on
Terrorism,
THE
HERITAGE
FOUNDATION
7
(Apr.
5,
2002),
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2002/04/somalia-and-al-qaeda-implications-for-the-waron-terrorism.
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Shabaab.191 Theoretically, this argument is plausible because such individuals do exist, albeit in very small numbers,192 and it is well established that Al-Qaeda agents were in contact with Somali Islamists during the 1990’s in an effort to expand their operations into the Horn of
Africa.193
This argument falls short for several reasons. First, Somali Islamists during the 1990’s had no known connection to 9/11, and although
there were suspicions that financing for the attacks was wired through
the Somali Al-Barakaat bank, these suspicions were ultimately proven
to be incorrect.194 Furthermore, as was discussed above, Al-Qaeda’s operations in Somalia during this period were unsuccessful.195 Numerous
factors were responsible for this failure, but it was mostly Al-Qaeda’s
inability to overcome distrust while traversing the logistical challenges
inherent in Somalia’s clan-based identity and poor infrastructure that
was responsible for the failure.196 Finally, while it is true that Al-Qaeda
agents resided in Somalia for the purpose of establishing training
camps, it would be a gross overstatement to argue that Somali Islamists
“harbored” Al-Qaeda terrorists.197 In fact, immediately following 9/11,
Somali Islamists closed the Al-Qaeda training camps for fear of American military reprisal, and Al-Qaeda agents in the region were forced to
flee or go into hiding.198 Even if one determines that Somali Islamists
were technically “harboring” Al-Qaeda agents at the time of 9/11, the
Al-Qaeda agents operating in Somalia had no known connection to the
9/11 attacks, and by all accounts, Al-Qaeda’s relationship with Somali
Islamists was purely superficial and lacked ideological harmony.199 In
addition, it is apparent from the Harmony Documents that Al-Qaeda’s
decision to commence operations in Somalia was unsolicited.200 There is
no indication that Somali Islamists invited or offered a safe haven to AlQaeda operatives,201 thus, asserting the AUMF’s “harboring” language
over Al-Shabaab merely because Al-Qaeda operatives were in contact
with Somali Islamists prior to 9/11 seems untenable and does not reso191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.

See supra text accompanying notes 49-77.
Hoehne, supra note 14, at 4, 6.
See supra text accompanying notes 46-48; see also Watts et al., supra note 21, at 19.
See supra text accompanying notes 77-79.
See supra text accompanying notes 43-50.
See supra Section II.B.
See supra Section II.A.
Hoehne, supra note 14, at 7.
Watts et al., supra note 21, at 6.
Id. at 4-6.
Id. at 5-6.
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nate with the established congressional intention.202
In summation, Al-Shabaab as an independent organization has no
connection to 9/11, and any affiliation with Al-Qaeda that may be imputed from the AIAI or the ICU is so tenuous that to claim it falls within
the scope of AUMF authorization would be disingenuous. Consequently, it is clear that AUMF authorization cannot be asserted over AlShabaab based on the Authorized Adversary element.
Applying AUMF authorization to Al-Shabaab under the third element is just as problematic. Under the Purpose element, military action
is authorized “in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations or persons”
that satisfy the preceding Authorized Adversary element.203 Thus, the final AUMF hoop requires that the targeted organization pose a continued
terrorist threat to American security.
Even if we disregard the prior analysis and instead conclude to the
contrary that Al-Shabaab does qualify as an Authorized Adversary,
American officials have still repeatedly taken the stance that AlShabaab does not pose a threat to national security. 204 Immediately following Al-Shabaab’s Nairobi mall attack on September 21, 2013, Attorney General Eric Holder asserted that there was no “specific, credible
evidence” that Al-Shabaab was planning a terrorist attack on American
soil.205 In addition, the associate director of the International Security
and Defense Policy Center at RAND Corporation offered testimony before the Committee of Foreign Affairs on October 13, 2013 asserting
that “Al-Shabaab does not appear to be plotting attacks against the U.S.
homeland.”206 Although these statements suggest that American officials
202. See supra text accompanying notes 137-40.
203. Authorization for Use of Military Force, supra note 2, § 2(a).
204. Even if these statements are not reflective of America’s true belief about the threat AlShabaab presents to America, the result will probably be the same. The Purpose element of the
AUMF is not operative in isolation and depends on the other two elements being satisfied. Pierre
Thomas, Holder Questions Al Shabab’s Ability to Strike Inside US Homeland, ABC NEWS (Sept.
26,
2013)
http://abcnews.go.com/US/holder-questions-al-shababs-ability-strike-insideus/story?id=20388547.
205. Id.
206. Jones, supra note 109, at 2. It is worth noting that both of these statements focus on
Homeland Security and fail to indicate whether Al-Shabaab poses a threat to American security
abroad. Indeed, the RAND testimony expressly indicates that Al-Shaabaab may pose such a
threat; “as the Westgate Mall attack shows, Al-Shabaab has the capability to conduct high-profile
attacks in the region. The United States should be on high alert in East Africa.” Id. While the
AUMF may be read broadly enough to encompass embassies and other international American
institutions, this discussion functions under the assumption that the Purpose element is read only
to encompass attacks within the United States. The foundation for this assumption seems to stem
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are unsettled about Al-Shabaab’s recent agression, it is clear that government officials do not currently believe Al-Shabaab poses a credible
threat within America’s borders.207 Consequently, it must be concluded
that because America does not believe Al-Shabaab threatens “future
acts of international terrorism against the United States,” Al-Shabaab
does not satisfy the Purpose element of the AUMF.208
From this analysis, it is clear that Al-Shabaab does not fulfill the
requirements for either the Authorized Adversary element or the Purpose element. Therefore, it does not fall within the scope of AUMF authorization. This is not surprising since Congress intended the language
in the original AUMF to be narrowly construed and authorization was
meant to apply only to those organizations, such as Al-Qaeda, possessing a nexus to the 9/11 attacks.209 Al-Shabaab’s clear failure to satisfy the AUMF’s requirements lends strong support to the conclusion that
American military strikes against this organization are extralegal.
Before the legal permissibility of military strikes against AlShabaab can be conclusively dismissed, however, it is necessary to
determine if Al-Shabaab can qualify under the dubious Associated
Forces label.210 As will be demonstrated below, the definition of an Associated Force promulgated by the current administration is so ambiguous and all-encompassing that it essentially renders the AUMF’s limitations moot.
According to the D.C. Circuit in Hamlily, an Associated Force, for
the purpose of detention authority, is a “co-belligerent . . . fighting in
association with one or more belligerent powers.”211 While this definition is unhelpfully vague, the court provides some clarity in note 17:
“‘Associated Forces’ does not include terrorist organizations who merely share an abstract philosophy or even a common purpose with al
Qaeda—there must be an actual association in the current conflict with
Al-Qaeda or the Taliban.”212
Note 17 in Hamiliy provides clear guidance regarding the proper
application of the Associated Forces label. This guidance has been
seemingly dismissed by the Obama Administration, which has not only
applied the Associated Forces label beyond the authority to detain, but
from the provided evidence that Congress intended the AUMF to be read narrowly.
207. Id.; see also Jones, note 109, at 2.
208. Authorization for Use of Military Force, supra note 2, § 2(a).
209. Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 113640, at 2109.
210. Hamlily v. Obama, 616 F. Supp. 2d 63, 74 (D.D.C. 2009).
211. Id. at 75.
212. Id. at 75 n.17
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has also inexplicably redefined the term. Accordingly, an Associated
Force now “[has] two characteristics: (1) [it is] an organized, armed
group that has entered the fight alongside Al-Qaeda, and (2) [it] is a cobelligerent with Al-Qaeda in hostilities against the United States or its
coalition partners.”213 A cursory comparison of the Hamlily and Obama
Administration’s definitions reveal that there is no universal understanding of what does and does not comprise an Associated Forces. As
one scholar aptly puts it: “what exactly does it mean to be an ‘associated
force?’ Are associated forces more closely tied to Al-Qaeda than its ‘allies’ or is this a lower standard? Is there a threshold level of support beyond which we call it ‘substantial?’”214 All of these are excellent questions that, if answered, would provide much needed clarity. It does
appear, however, that the American government has decided not to
broach this subject.215
The Obama Administration’s apparent willingness to not only expand application of the Associated Forces label to the use of lethal
force, but also to fabricate a completely different standard for the term,
has generated legitimate concern that the Associated Forces label is being used to circumvent the AUMF and justify military and drone strikes
against “extra-AUMF” targets.216 Al-Shabaab represents a group that illustrates this concern and the subsequent analysis will evaluate whether
Al-Shabaab can be considered an Associated Force.
In accordance with the Obama Administration’s first requirement,
no one disputes that Al-Shabaab is both armed and organized. However,
whether or not Al-Shabaab “has entered the fight alongside Al-Qaeda”
is questionable.217 On the one hand, it is established that Al-Shabaab and
preceding Somali Islamist organizations prior to 9/11 did utilize AlQaeda’s military and pecuniary assistance to facilitate their own military operations.218 In addition, Al-Shabaab vocally supported Al-Qaeda
in 2012 when Al-Shabaab’s leader, Mukhtar Abu al-Zubair, stated,
“[o]n behalf of the soldiers and the commanders in Al-Shabaab, we
pledge allegiance to you. So lead us to the path of jihad and martyrdom
that was drawn by our imam, the martyr Osama.”219
213. Johnson speech, supra note 169.
214. Cronogue, supra note 156, at 397.
215. Harper, supra note 113.
216. Daskal & Vladeck, supra note 3, at 7.
217. Johnson speech, supra note 169.
218. See supra Section II.
219. CNN Wire Staff, supra note 119(it is worth noting here that Pledging allegiance is not
equivalent to swearing an Oath of Loyalty.)
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Words, however, are not actions. To date, Al-Shabaab has never
committed a terrorist attack reflecting Al-Qaeda’s western-focused Jihad, nor has it assumed an operationally subservient position to AlQaeda command.220 In fact, Al-Shabaab, like all prior Somali Islamist
organizations, has remained autonomous and mostly fixated on reclaiming territory from Ethiopia, destabilizing the Western constructed TFG,
and establishing Sharia rule.221 In addition, Hamlily’s clarification that
Associated Forces must share a connection greater than a mere abstract
philosophy or common purpose with Al-Qaeda supports the argument
that words alone are insufficient.222 As a result, the evidence supporting
a conclusion that Al-Shabaab “has entered the fight alongside [Al-]
Qaeda” is not wholly dispositive.223
The second requirement mandates that the terrorist organization be
“a co-belligerent with [Al-]Qaeda in hostilities against the United States
or its coalition partners.”224 As previously discussed, there is no “specific, credible evidence” that Al-Shabaab poses a threat within American
borders.225 However, the inclusion of “coalition partners” seemingly
represents a vast expansion of the AUMF’s Purpose element. Under this
expansion, not only would drone and military strikes no longer serve the
purpose of only preventing “future acts of international terrorism
against the United States,” but it would also serve to protect any one of
the fifty nations participating in the post-9/11 coalition against terrorism.226 Because some of these “coalition partners” (namely Ethiopia,
Kenya, and Eritrea) have suffered the brunt of Al-Shabaab’s aggression,
it must be conceded that Al-Shabaab most likely satisfies the second Associated Forces requirement since the organization is engaged in hostilities against its coalition partners.
220. For a list of Al-Shabaab attacks, see International Terrorist Symbol Database, ADL,
http://archive.adl.org/terrorism/symbols/al_shabaab.html.
221. Mapping Militant Organizations: Al Ittihad Al Islamiya, supra note 37; see generally
Mapping Militant Organizations: Al-Shabaab, supra note 31.
222. Hamlily v. Obama, 616 F. Supp. 2d 63, 74 (D.D.C. 2009).
223. Johnson speech, supra note 169.
224. Id.
225. See supra text accompanying notes 206-208; Pierre Thomas, Mike Levine, Jack Date &
Jack Cloherty, Holder Questions Al Shabab’s Ability To Strike Inside US Homeland, ABC NEWS
(Sept. 26 2013) available at http://abcnews.go.com/US/holder-questions-al-shababs-abilitystrike-inside-us/story?id=20388547.
226. Coalition
Countries,
UNITED
STATES
CENTRAL
COMMAND,
http://www.centcom.mil/en/countries/coalition (last visited Dec. 15, 2013);
Authorization for Use of Military Force, supra note 2; see also supra Section II (discussing how
Ethiopia has been in conflict with Somali Islamists for years, while Al-Shabaab recently attacked
a mall in Nairobi Kenya).
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While Al-Shabaab’s status as an Associated Force is debatable, it
is readily apparent that the organization could feasibly qualify as an Associated Force despite falling completely outside the scope of AUMF
authorization. This apparent conflict is deeply concerning because the
Associated Forces label sits on precarious legal footing and its existence
blurs the AUMF’s clear parameters.227
From a practical standpoint, the potential consequences of broad
Associated Forces application are profound, and it seems impossible to
reconcile the addition of “coalition partners” with the AUMF’s Purpose
element. With the addition of Associated Forces, application of military
force is no longer constrained to those groups that pose a future threat of
terrorism only to the United States, and the scope of the conflict has arguably expanded into a global war on terror.228 When considering this
consequence, one cannot help but harken back to President Bush’s foreshadowing statement made only two days after the AUMF’s ratification:
“[o]ur war on terror begins with al Qaeda, but it does not end there. It
will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found,
stopped and defeated.”229
V. CONCLUSION
Based on the above analysis, it is clear that drone and military
strikes against Al-Shabaab are not authorized under the limiting language of the AUMF, yet may nevertheless be permitted under the expansive Associated Forces interpretation. This apparent discrepancy is
not localized to Al-Shabaab, but rather presents one example of the
questionable analysis that flows from these often-conflicting justifications. Additionally problematic is the fact that the Associated Forces
expansion does not rest on any clear legal footing, yet vastly expands
the scope of the AUMF’s congressionally intended authorization. The
AUMF clearly and intentionally limited the scope of authorization to
those sharing a nexus to 9/11, while the Associated Forces expansion
purports a broad and “unbound” war on terror. This discrepancy produces applications that are both puzzling and contradictory.
227. Daskal & Vladeck, supra note 3, at 7.
228. Robert Chesney, Thoughts on the Brennan Speech: Scope of the AUMF, CCF, JSOC,
and Other Issues, LAWFARE
(May 2, 2012, 1:28 PM), http://www.lawfareblog.com/2012/05/thoughts-on-the-brennan-speechscope-of-the-aumf-ccf-jsoc-and-other-issues/; see also Gabor Rona, Thoughts on Brennan’s
Speech, OPINO JURIS, (May 2, 2012, 3:18 AM), http://opiniojuris.org/2012/05/02/thoughts-onbrennans-speech/.
229. Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 136, at 2049.
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The apparent controversy between the AUMF and the Associated
Forces label could have been resolved by section 1034 of the National
Defense Authorization Act for the 2012 Fiscal Year. If passed, section
1034, Affirmation of Armed Conflict With Al-Qaeda, would have codified Associated Forces as a clear expansion to the AUMF and eliminated the “nebulous 9/11 requirement.”230 Curiously, the Obama Administration threatened to veto the bill, arguing that 1034 “would effectively
recharacterize [the conflict’s] scope and . . . risk creating confusion regarding applicable standards.”231 In the face of this presidential pressure,
1034 was removed from the final bill in favor of a restatement of America’s detention authority.232
Why President Obama opposed legislation that would provide a
clear legal foundation to corroborate the questionable contemporary application of the Associated Forces label remains uncertain. Perhaps the
reason was politically motivated, stemming from concern that the public
eye would perceive 1034 as authorizing a permanent War on Terror. Indeed, support for this theory can be derived from a recent speech President Obama gave before the National Defense University where he asserted his intention “to engage Congress about the existing
Authorization to Use Military Force, or AUMF, to determine how we
can continue to fight terrorism without keeping America on a perpetual
wartime footing.”233 However, if the United States plans to continue
adding to the patchwork of competing AUMF expansions in order to
shoehorn additional terrorist organizations into the umbrella of authorization, is America not artificially extending the life of its original international armed conflict with Al-Qaeda? So long as that international
armed conflict endures, are we not “on a perpetual wartime footing?”
As recent events have clearly articulated, the face of terrorism is in
flux. Young terrorist organizations—organizations such as Al-Shabaab
that possess little or no connection to 9/11—are emerging and employing new recruitment and terror tactics that resonate with the modern
age. It is time for the American government to honestly reassess its dat230. Cronogue, supra note 156, at 396.
231. Chris Anders, Obama White House Threatens a Veto Over Worldwide War and Detention Provisions, ACLU BLOG OF RIGHTS (May 24, 2011, 9:03 PM),
https://www.aclu.org/blog/national-security/obama-white-house-threatens-veto-over-worldwidewar-and-detention-provisions.
232. For the final language of 1034, see National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2012, Pub. L. No. 112-81, §1034, 125 Stat. 1298 (2011), available at
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-112publ81/pdf/PLAW-112publ81.pdf.
233. Obama’s Remarks, supra note 1.
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ed policy on terrorism because, with each passing year, application of
the AUMF becomes more tenuous and the language fades further from
relevance. Moreover, relying on the legally ambiguous Associated
Forces expansion to pick up the slack where the AUMF falls short is a
disingenuous solution not befitting our great Nation. Whether the American government decides to deactivate the AUMF and phase out the
War on Terror, or pass new legislation that comfortably encompasses
Al-Shabaab and other modern day terrorist threats, is a decision to be
made through timely debate and the democratic process. Whatever the
case, it is undeniable that after twelve years of hard-ridden mileage
spanning two presidential administrations, the AUMF’s utility has run
its course.

